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Advanced Review
Ethics and geoengineering:
reviewing the moral issues raised
by solar radiation management
and carbon dioxide removal
Christopher J. Preston∗
After two decades of failure by the international community to respond
adequately to the threat of global climate change, discussions of the possibility
of geoengineering a cooler climate have recently proliferated. Alongside the
considerable optimism that these technologies have generated, there has also been
wide acknowledgement of significant ethical concerns. Ethicists, social scientists,
and experts in governance have begun the work of addressing these concerns. The
plethora of ethical issues raised by geoengineering creates challenges for those who
wish to survey them. The issues are here separated out according to the temporal
spaces in which they first arise. Some crop up when merely contemplating the
prospect of geoengineering. Others appear as research gets underway. Another
set of issues attend the actual implementation of the technologies. A further set
occurs when planning for the cessation of climate engineering. Two cautions about
this organizational schema are in order. First, even if the issues first arise in the
temporal spaces identified, they do not stay completely contained within them. A
good reason to object to the prospect of geoengineering, for example, will likely
remain a good reason to object to its implementation. Second, the ethical concerns
intensify or weaken depending on the technology under consideration. The wide
range of geoengineering technologies currently being discussed makes it prudent
that each technique should be evaluated individually for its ethical merit. © 2012
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
How to cite this article:
WIREs Clim Change 2013, 4:23–37. doi: 10.1002/wcc.198
INTRODUCTION
Since the emergence of geoengineering as a seriouspolicy option for addressing climate change,
there has been a widespread recognition that ethical
considerations form an essential component of
the research landscape. Scientific communities have
learned from hard experience that the passage from
laboratory to field for emerging technologies is more
difficult without a concerted effort to address the
social and ethical issues in a public and responsible
fashion. In the case of geoengineering, the glaring and
voluminous nature of the moral challenges means that
∗Correspondence to: Christopher.Preston@umontana.edu
Department of Philosophy and Program on Ethics and Public
Affairs, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, USA
neglecting to consider them in depth would make
it much less likely the technology would ever be
implemented. The issues are not only numerous, they
are also difficult. Affirming geoengineering’s moral
minefield, the UK’s Royal Society has stated that
‘the greatest challenges to the successful deployment
of geoengineering may be the social, ethical, legal,
and political issues associated with governance, rather
than scientific and technical issues’ (Ref 1, p. xi).a,2
Responding to this observation, ethicists have recently
begun probing the complicated moral terrain.
Before the publication of Crutzen’s landmark
essay in Climatic Change in 2006,3 discussion of
geoengineering had remained largely in the shadows
due to the worry that the mere mention of a techni-
cal solution to warming temperatures might weaken
Volume 4, January/February 2013 © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 23
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
political efforts at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The ethics of geoengineering is unusual for how it
began with a taboo on even discussing the topic.4
Also unusual is that most of its advocates see geoengi-
neering as only a temporary measure. Geoengineering
therefore stands out among emerging technologies for
the way the ethical issues belong in a finite spectrum
of temporal spaces stretching from the mere mention
of it as a possible future technology through to the
question of how to bring geoengineering activities to
a close. A helpful way to categorize the ethical issues
may be to consider them within this temporal frame
based on when each issue first arises. In a discus-
sion of how the precautionary principle factors into
the geoengineering discussion, Elliot identified three
temporal spaces in which precaution should be consid-
ered (‘Discussing Geoengineering’, ‘Researching Geo-
engineering’, and ‘Choosing to Geoengineer’).5 This
review uses a similar methodology and sifts the ethical
issues into categories: (1) Those that arise during mere
contemplation of the possibility of geoengineering;
(2) Those arising during research and development;
(3) Those arising in the course of implementation;
and (4) Those that might occur post-implementation.
This organizing schema is not perfect. Several of the
ethical issues appear in more than one of these tem-
poral phases. The schema is also complicated by the
fact that the issues raised by different geoengineering
technologies vary. Nevertheless, this organizing mode
helps to provide some separation between issues, even
though a few will continuously surge and fade in
importance throughout each of the temporal frames.
No position will be taken on the question of which
part of the temporal frame is most ethically significant.
THE BASIC LANDSCAPE
OF GEOENGINEERING
A common contemporary definition of geoengineering
is ‘the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the
planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic
climate change’ (Ref 1, p. 1). The 2009 Royal
Society Report established what has become a
canonical distinction between those techniques that
attempt to address the global warming problem
by reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide (carbon
dioxide removal, CDR) and those that simply address
warming symptoms by reflecting back sunlight (solar
radiation mamagement, SRM). Examples of CDR
include afforestation, enhanced weathering of rocks,
liming the oceans, large-scale production of synthetic
algae, direct air capture of carbon dioxide, and ocean
fertilization. Examples of SRM include increasing the
albedo of terrestrial or marine surfaces (e.g., white
roofs, bioengineered crops, or ocean microbubbles),
enhancing tropospheric clouds, reducing cirrus clouds,
projecting sulfate particles in the stratosphere, and
deploying reflective mirrors in space. Overviews of
many of these techniques can be found in a 2008
special issue of Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society A,6 in numerous reports,1,7,8 and in
books by Jeff Goodell9 and Eli Kintisch.10
Since CDR in some of its forms (e.g., direct air
capture) is scalable and sounds very much like pol-
lution control, it is common to perceive CDR as less
morally problematic than SRM. Furthermore, since
some forms of CDR (e.g., afforestation, accelerated
phytoplankton blooms) appear to mimic or enhance
existing natural processes, public perception of CDR
tends initially to be more favorable (‘respecting
nature’11) than for technologies that appear less ‘natu-
ral’ such as stratospheric aerosols or space mirrors.b,12
The Royal Society Report favored CDR over SRM
stating ‘CDR techniques offer a longer term approach
to addressing climate change than SRM methods and
generally have fewer uncertainties and risks’ (Ref 1,
p. 54). Also counting against SRM is the fact that, by
addressing only symptoms rather than causes, SRM
leaves carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, ensuring that
the problem of ocean acidification will continue.
This preference for CDR has been questioned
by those with concerns about the ecological impact
of large-scale CDR technologies.11 Proponents of
stratospheric aerosols have also pointed out that,
despite its problems, SRM remains ‘fast’, ‘effective’,
and ‘cheap’,13,14 requiring a matter of weeks to
take effect rather than decades. They add that it is
the only geoengineering technique already observed
in action (after previous volcanic eruptions). If
geoengineering had to be deployed in the face of
an abrupt climate catastrophe—a condition some
think would be the only acceptable condition for
implementation3,15—then, despite its risks, some
planetary albedo modification would almost certainly
be required.
As much of the discussion below is focused on
the moral obstacles to geoengineering, an important
point to mention at the start is that, if successful,
engineering the climate could potentially lessen
an enormous amount of human suffering and
environmental harm from global climate change.
Lessening these harms is a huge potential benefit of
geoengineering (and, of course, is the main reason its
advocates pursue it). These advantages are amplified
if it could be done with little harm to the global
economy. When immersed in an extended discussion
of the moral challenges created by geoengineering, one
should not lose sight of the huge potential gains that
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are part of the essential context for any discussion of
the ethics of geoengineering.
TEMPORAL SPACE 1: ISSUES RAISED
IN CONTEMPLATING THE PROSPECT
OF GEOENGINEERING
As indicated by the pre-2006 taboo, some of the ethical
issues occur before any work on the technology has
even begun. These concerns focus on the whole idea of
intentionally engineering the climate. In some cases,
if these concerns are decisive, they might preclude
the possibility of beginning geoengineering at all.
In others, they might lend important shape to how
geoengineering proceeds.
Moral Hazard
The reluctance to talk about geoengineering pre-
2006 was based largely on the concern that the
prospect of a technical solution to climate change
created a ‘moral hazard’ that might encourage risky
behavior or influence the willingness of parties
to engage in mitigation and adaptation. ‘Moral
hazard’ is a term taken originally from the insurance
industry suggesting that certain types of insurance
create behavioral changes increasing an individual’s
exposure to risk (Ref 16, p. 116). The suggestion
that even the prospect of geoengineering creates a
moral hazard is cited in numerous reports and articles
as one of the risks of putting the geoengineering
option on the table.1,2,7,16–22 Even those advocating
for geoengineering research seem to anticipate this
risk by firmly cautioning that continued efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions must accompany any
geoengineering research.1,7,13
The exact impact that the prospect of
geoengineering will have on future behavior is, of
course, an empirical matter, untestable until the
situation actually unfolds.23 But there is no doubt
there are limited economic, institutional, and political
resources available to address climate change making
it reasonable to suggest that geoengineering could
divert energy and resources from mitigation measures.
The moral hazard warning, however, turns out
to be a little more complex than it appears. Hale has
pointed out that the appellation is ambiguous, lacking
clarity on whether it points toward a disincentive to
mitigate, a positive incentive to produce more carbon
dioxide, or a diversion of resources from adaptation.16
Simply calling something a moral hazard does not
actually establish a wrong unless it can be shown that
the behavior the hazard precipitates is itself morally
problematic. This ambiguity makes policy responses
more difficult. Should a government motivate people
to reduce emissions further, should it commit more
money to adaptation, or should it endeavor to keep
as many options open as possible? Hale is concerned
that the blanket warning about a moral hazard gives
little guidance.
An additional wrinkle in the moral hazard
debate is found in the suggestion that talk of
geoengineering might, in fact, have the opposite effect
and encourage people to do more to mitigate climate
change. Only if policy-makers and the public get a
true sense of how desperately something needs to be
done will they finally become motivated to reduce
emissions (Ref 1, p. 43). This suggestion of a ‘reverse
moral hazard’ is again an empirical matter, resolvable
only through careful social science research. Gardiner
doubts the likelihood of reversal, pointing out that
the massive political inertia already demonstrated
on climate change seems unlikely to vanish simply
because scientists start pursuing a particular climate
engineering technology (Ref 11, pp. 166–168).
Moral Corruption
Gardiner has added that the prospect of geoengineer-
ing creates a ‘deeper ethical hazard’ (Ref 11, p. 167)
than the hazard just described. Building on worries
about the tendency of those in the rich nations toward
moral corruption in the face of the ‘perfect moral
storm’ of anthropogenic climate change,24 Gardiner
suggests that the temptation to pursue geoengineering
demonstrates the continuing ‘subversion of our moral
discourse to our own ends’ (Ref 25, p. 286). Cli-
mate change is an unusually difficult problem due to
both spatial and temporal separation of its causes and
effects, and a lack of available theoretical and institu-
tional resources available to deal with it. Rather than
battle this perfect storm it has proven much simpler to
find excuses for continuing with business-as-usual, a
failure to which certain vested interests in the wealthy
nations have clearly succumbed. As Gardiner puts
it, ‘groups with which many of us identify are pre-
dominantly responsible for creating the problem, are
currently largely ignoring the problem, and are also
refusing to address the problem in the best way pos-
sible because of a strong attachment to lesser values’
(Ref 25, p. 303).
Having failed to do anything effectual about
climate change over the last 20 years, the global
community might easily continue this pattern of
neglect by committing to a risky and untested
technological path with uncertain effects on future
persons and especially the poor. Gardiner thinks it
is culpable self-deception to persuade oneself that a
Volume 4, January/February 2013 © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 25
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geoengineering program is an adequate alternative to
emissions reductions. For Gardiner, this self-deception
‘might reveal just how far we are prepared to go
to avoid confronting climate change directly’ (Ref
25, p. 304) while imposing considerable burdens on
posterity.19–21 This may be a ‘tarnishing’, even a
‘blighting’, evil.
Hubris
Another complaint arising at the prospect of geoengi-
neering is that it demonstrates a hubristic attitude
about the kind of capabilities that humans possess.
Over the last 40 years of environmental thinking, a
case has been made that many environmental woes
result from the misdirected attempt of humans to exert
dominion or control over natural processes rather
than to find out how to live alongside them.26–29 It
has been suggested that, as a relatively late arriving
species on the earthly scene, humans need to learn
some humility and give up on the idea of re-shaping
nature entirely to their own transient ends.30 Failure
to do so demonstrates a culpable arrogance.
In one of the earliest articles on the ethics of
‘intentional climate change’, Jamieson drew attention
to the hubris in the very idea of geoengineering.31
He suggested that numerous environmental problems
stem from ‘our attempts to manipulate nature in order
to make it conform to our desires rather than forming
our desires in response to nature’ (Ref 31, p. 331). He
noted a regrettable tendency for human interactions
with the environment to be ‘arrogant’ and ‘intrusive’.
Geoengineering, at least on the surface, appears to
continue in this pattern.
Although the argument from hubris does not
necessarily preclude geoengineeringc it fits with a
common tendency in environmental ethics to think
that earth’s historical biogeochemical processes pos-
sess some moral significance in themselves.32 Preston
has suggested this might create a ‘presumptive argu-
ment’ against geoengineering based in environmental
ethics.33 He cautions that this argument from the value
of historic processes may ultimately be defeasible, but
it does place a heavy burden of proof on those who
advocate interference when other options are still on
the table.
Technological Fix
A further consideration lurking in the background is
the question of whether the climate problem is really
the type of problem that requires a ‘technological fix’.
In 1967, Alvin Weinberg coined the term ‘techno-
logical fix’ to capture the strategy of substituting an
engineering solution for a difficult social or behavioral
problem.34 Such technical fixes are attractive when cit-
izens have repeatedly demonstrated a failure to make
required behavioral changes.35 Technological solu-
tions can often be simpler, quicker, and demand less
from people than the large social transformations that
might otherwise be required. Without the assistance of
technology, combating climate change would demand
massive social and behavioral change. Scott calls SRM
proposals ‘textbook examples of a technological fix’
(Ref 36, p. 159).
The moral status of technological fixes is
ambiguous. While citizens repeatedly demonstrate a
preference for technical fixes when faced with difficult
behavioral demands and while technological fixes
do appear to frequently solve many difficult social
problems,36,37 the term is often used negatively to
connote a superficial and inadequate solution to a
deeper problem. A geoengineering solution would
permit continuing high levels of consumption, waste,
and greenhouse gas emissions. Environmental thinkers
usually advocate for a change in these values rather
than simply deploying a technology that allows
pernicious behaviors to continue.36,38,39 Corner and
Pidgeon warn that ‘[f]or groups and individuals
who see climate change as a symptom of a social
and economic order that is inherently unsustainable,
geoengineering represents the worst kind of ‘‘techno-
fix’’’ (Ref 40, p. 31).
Is this a serious worry? In the case of SRM, the
inadequacy of the techno-fix is immediately evident
both in the continuation of ocean acidification under
elevated atmospheric carbon and in the threat of very
rapid warming should SRM have to be withdrawn.
With a CDR technology such as direct air capture, it
might be less easy to find arguments against consump-
tion of fossil fuels if greenhouse gases had stopped
accumulating.d The fix may in many ways be ade-
quate.
As these last remarks make clear, the extent
to which concerns raised by the mere prospect of
geoengineering arise depends, a great deal, on the
type of technology under discussion. Afforestation
does not appear to display hubris in the same way
that placing mirrors in space might, since the former
appears to be more ‘natural’ than the latter.11 Direct
air capture of CO2 may not provide the moral hazard
that stratospheric aerosols do, since the technology
inherently acknowledges the need to get carbon
dioxide out of the atmosphere. The extent to which
the global community commits to mitigation and
adaptation will also impact the reactions generated
by the prospect of engineering the climate.
Despite the influence of these variables, there
are clearly constituencies who cannot reconcile
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themselves to any prospect of geoengineering.e These
sceptics doubt the ability of any restoration to fully
make amends for the original wrong.41 While a
number of years have passed since the taboo on
discussing geoengineering was broken by Crutzen,
these constituencies will insist that the prospective
moral issues are not moot. The categories of pre-
emptive moral concern may even re-occur in the later
temporal spaces to which we now turn.
TEMPORAL SPACE 2: RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
In the 6 years since discussion of geoengineering
emerged openly on the public stage, laboratory
research of different technologies has accelerated,
publication and discussion of results has been
voluminous, and the first few field trials have taken
place. Experiments on the effects of iron fertilization in
the ocean have occurred,42 sulfate particles have been
sprayed from helicopters to test reflective properties,43
and a hose and balloon technology for deploying
aerosols came close to being trialed.44 The rapid
expansion of activity raises a set of ethical issues
of a different kind. These issues center on how to
ethically govern this active research area.
A puzzle arises here because geoengineering
research is not always cleanly separable from geo-
engineering deployment. The limitations of computer-
based climate models mean that it may be impossible
to properly test the response of the global climate
system without some measure of implementation.
‘Process’ experiments to test the efficacy of deploy-
ment technologies—such as the proposed S.P.I.C.E.
experiment in the UK (see Box 1)—could likely be
done at a small scale with negligible climate impact.
Field testing the efficacy of space mirrors, on the other
hand, may not be possible without watching for an
actual change in global temperatures. The line between
testing and implementation is sometimes blurry. Leav-
ing this problem aside, several attempts have been
made to raise and address ethical issues associated
with conducting research.
Principles Governing Research
While there is a general presumption in many
democratic nations toward freedom of scientific
inquiry, the controversial nature of geoengineering
has spawned several attempts to supply ethical
principles to govern research and the path to
deployment. One of the earliest attempts were
the so-called ‘Oxford Principles’, submitted to the
UK House of Commons Science and Technology
BOX 1
CANCELLATION OF S.P.I.C.E.
(STRATOSPHERIC PARTICLE INJECTION
FOR CLIMATE ENGINEERING)
EXPERIMENT
In May 2012, a small field experiment to
test a hose and balloon delivery system for
future stratospheric aerosol deployment was
cancelled by researchers. The experiment would
have attempted to spray a 150 L of water (ap-
proximately 2 bathloads) from a height of 1 km.
It would have been a ‘process’ experiment
to assess delivery technology rather than an
experiment to test the response of the climate
system. The scale of the experiment posed
no danger of impacting the climate and
negligible environmental risk. Nevertheless, an
environmental watchdog called the ETC Group
publicly objected to the experiment on the
grounds that it set the stage to proceed down a
‘very high risk technological path’.45
Matt Watson, a member of the S.P.I.C.E.
team, offered his own opinion of the main
reasons for cancellation.46 In the light of the S.P.
I.C.E. team’s endorsement of the Oxford Prin-
ciples, there was some concern amongst team
members that no governance structures were
yet in place to oversee this field experiment.
A patent application for an aerosol delivery
system submitted before the S.P.I.C.E. project
began created the impression of a conflict
on the question of whether the technology
would be a public or private good. Finally,
the time required for further deliberation and
stakeholder involvement made postponement
undesirable.
The cancellation demonstrated that pub-
lic perceptions of geoengineering currently
make the transition from laboratory studies
to small-scale field trials extremely challenging.
Select Committee in December 2009.47 These
principles recommend: (1) geoengineering to be
regulated as a public good; (2) public participation
in geoengineering decision making; (3) disclosure of
geoengineering research and open publication of
results; (4) independent assessment of impacts; (5).
governance before deployment. In addition to the
commitment to transparency and wide participation,
the Oxford principles are notable for stipulating that
geoengineering should not be driven by profit—raising
questions about what are the appropriate funding
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sources—and that a workable governance regime must
be in place before any attempt at implementation. A
slight variation of the Oxford principles was endorsed
by a group of 175 experts in science, ethics, and policy
who gathered at Asilomar, California in March 2010
to discuss voluntary guidelines for research.
A different take on the ethical requirements
for research was offered in an article published
in Environmental Research Letters. Morrow et al.48
recommended borrowing certain principles—with
roots in Kant49 and Aristotle50—from medical ethics
in order to govern research outside of the lab. A
principle of respect requires the public’s consent
before initiating any potentially harmful field research.
Principles of beneficence and justice demand both
a favorable risk–benefit ratio before commencing
research and the fair distribution of any benefits
or harms that do occur. A minimization principle
requires experiments to be as small as possible to
test a given hypothesis. While generally meeting
with approval within the ethics community, both
this article and the Oxford principles were merely
recommendations with no binding force.f They are
also both vague enough that it is not always clear
when their conditions are met.
Lock-In and Path Dependency
Expensive technologies requiring the development
of large amounts of institutional structure and
research expertise are prone to the phenomenon
of ‘path dependency’ or ‘lock-in’.7,21,25,31 According
to Jamieson, the institutional and human structures
developed to research an emerging technology
function as ‘an interest group promoting the
development of the technology they are investigating’
(Ref 31, p. 333). The more time and money that are
invested in research, the harder it becomes to stop that
technology from moving toward implementation.
Technological lock-in means that the pressure
to implement geoengineering from vested institutions
could potentially overwhelm the caution the
technology demands. Ott warns that the beginning
of research into geoengineering sits at the top
of a ‘slippery slope’ toward deployment (Ref 21,
pp. 37–39). Gardiner similarly notes the considerable
‘institutional momentum’ a geoengineering project
might accumulate (Ref 25, p. 289). Hourdequin
observes that newly created interests ‘may create
momentum to implement SRM strategies despite the
risks or before just decision-making procedures are
established’ (Ref 20, p. 27).
One might observe that some measure of path
dependency is an unavoidable phenomenon associated
with any large technological endeavor. Experience
suggests this is particularly true in the energy
field due to the enormous infrastructure investments
required.51 Given these facts, is there any reason
to be particularly concerned about lock-in with
geoengineering?
Gardiner’s warnings about moral corruption
and the political inertia around climate change in
general make the potential lock-in of geoengineering
particularly worrisome. The populations of wealthy
nations have shown themselves to be particularly
obtuse on the issue of climate action.g Geoengineering
might therefore prove to be tempting in a way
that the technology does not warrant. The risky
technological fix may drown out the more sober
structural changes of a safer path forward. As Buck52
and Ott21 have pointed out, stratospheric aerosol
technologies in particular promise a type of lock-in
that might dangerously restrict future options.
Participation of the Vulnerable
It has been noted that uncertainty about the effects
of many geoengineering technologies on regional
weather make it quite likely that, alongside those
who will be made better off, some of those most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change might
end up being harmed.h The SRMGI report warned
that ‘SRM research could constitute a cheap fix
to a problem created by developed countries, while
further transferring environmental risk to the poorest
countries and the most vulnerable people’ (Ref 7,
p. 21). An article otherwise more positive about the
effect of stratospheric aerosols on the global food
supply cautioned that significant regional variability
means SRM may still ‘pose a risk to local food security
if subsistence farming prevails and adaptation is not
possible’ (Ref 53, p. 3). A Woodrow Wilson Center
report expressed concern that ‘[p]opulations living at
the edge of subsistence—those with the least capacity
to adapt to the impacts of climate change and almost
no voice in international deliberations—are precisely
the populations that will be most vulnerable to any
negative side effects that geoengineering experiments
may have. . .’ (Ref 54, p. 39). The many injustices of
climate change foisted on the global poor could be
unintentionally compounded by geoengineering.55,56
Given this potential for compound injustice, the
need for vulnerable populations to be represented
in the research discussion that will set the path for
geoengineering is clear.
Calls for public engagement in the development
of major technologies are increasingly common in
social science.40,57–59 Engagement with the most
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marginalized and vulnerable to climate disruption
presents some of the greatest challenges. As Anthony
Lieserowitz has put it ‘[w]hat does informed consent
mean in a world where more than two billion people
are unaware that climate change is a problem?’60
Despite the challenges, Corner and Pidgeon suggest
that ‘[p]ublic engagement need not (and should
not) be restricted to the citizens of industrialized,
Western nations’ (Ref 40, p. 34). The importance
of incorporating the views of the vulnerable
and the marginalized in the discussion of future
geoengineering presents a significant moral demand.
Despite these good intentions, some remain
deeply skeptical based on past experience about the
likelihood of any genuine attempt to engage with
indigenous peoples over geoengineering.61 Far more
likely, says Whyte, a member of the Potawatomi
Nation, is that a geoengineering agenda will already
be set before tribes are ‘consulted’ about what is
going to happen anyway. Such an approach, according
to Whyte, continues to propagate the assumption
that ‘developing nations have the privileged role in
determining the vision and priorities for Indigenous
peoples’ (Ref 61, p. 75). Whyte advocates an
alternative ‘partnership model’ consistent with the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous people.
Such a model would guarantee to indigenous people
a fundamental ‘respect for their sovereignty over the
territories that they depend on for their basic needs and
for fulfilling their preferred lifeways’ (Ref 61, p. 75).
Developing a similar theme, Preston observes how the
burdens of climate change have the potential to be
compounded for certain vulnerable peoples.62 Given
both the risks and the likelihood of technological lock-
in, he argues these populations deserve to have some
input into the shape of today’s geoengineering research
agenda. But this call for the inclusion of marginalized
voices is not simply a moral call. Such input also has
the potential to make substantive improvements to the
research itself. This is especially true for technologies
that promise large social impacts in a framework of
high uncertainty.57,63–65 Including marginalized voices
in planning geoengineering research may not just be
good ethics, it may also be good science.
TEMPORAL SPACE 3:
IMPLEMENTATION
While not a consensus view, some participants in the
SRMGI process felt that ethical considerations become
more urgent as the technology moves from computer
modeling to field testing to actual deployment and
implementation.7 At the point of implementation
certain matters of basic justice foreshadowed at earlier
stages become urgent and new ethical concerns surface
for the first time.
Procedural Justice
If the problems of participation and consent first
arise in the context of research, there is no doubt
whatsoever that their reappearance in the context
of implementation is one of the biggest ethical
challenges geoengineering faces. As an engineering
project promising global impacts, some form of
consent—at least from the representatives of those
affected—would appear to be a non-negotiable
requirement of just procedure.66,67 Corner and
Pidgeon put it this way: ‘the prospect of controlling the
global thermostat is something that all citizens could
reasonably claim to have a legitimate stake in’ (Ref
40, p. 29). In addition to the fundamental question of
whether or not to proceed, questions about how to
balance geoengineering efforts with mitigation efforts,
how rapidly to ramp up the chosen technology (if
it is scalable), how to most effectively evaluate the
impacts of the technology, what to set as targets, and
which political entity (or entities) should take charge
all require stakeholder input. Many of these questions
are theoretically captured under the broad umbrella of
the Oxford Principles’ demand for ‘governance before
deployment’. But that broad umbrella gives little sense
of the magnitude of the task. Gardiner advises ‘the
emergence of geoengineering may signal special issues
of political legitimacy, prompting the need for new or
strengthened global norms of justice and community,
and novel institutions’ (Ref 11, p. 171). As in the
perfect moral storm of climate change, the institutions
for resolving the procedural questions may simply not
exist at this point.
The goal of creating a just governance procedure
is, of course, an enormous challenge with any
global technology. The barriers to achieving effective
governance on climate change are likely to be
exacerbated in geoengineering where divergence
between the interests of different countries is projected
to increase over time.68 But the interests of the
different players cannot be ignored. As David Keith
has pointed out, both SRM and CDR are ultimately
engineering technologies.69 Engineers serve clients
with a huge variety of wants and needs. Geoengineers
need stakeholder involvement. Balancing the diverging
interests of more than seven billion stakeholders,
however, is an unlikely task. Since these interests also
extend far into the future and include the interests
of non-human nature, there is little possibility of any
familiar form of consent.20,70
Under the banner of procedural justice one
might also add the considerable security concerns
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that geoengineering presents. The ability to alter
the climate is of obvious strategic interest to global
powers and those invested in the political stability of
particular regions. Modification of the weather for
military or hostile purposes has been banned by the
Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)
since 1977. However, some climate engineering
techniques might still be performed unilaterally, either
for hostile purposes or simply in an attempt by
one nation to reduce the negative impacts of rising
temperatures on their population.14 Alternatively,
a particularly wealthy individual—the so-called
‘greenfinger’ scenario—might initiate geoengineering
for what is perceived to be the greater good.9,10 Some
members of the international community might even
publicly frown upon unilateral geoengineering, while
privately embracing the fact that someone had gone
ahead with an action that was otherwise politically
impossible.
It is far from clear how these complicated pro-
cedural and political questions will ever be answered
satisfactorily.55 Geoengineering activities taking place
entirely on a country’s own soil, such as carbon cap-
ture, might raise fewer political and legal questions
than those taking place on the global commons, such
as stratospheric aerosols or marine cloud enhance-
ment. With technologies involving the commons, the
SRMGI report concedes that ‘it may be impossible
to reach agreements that are acceptable to all parties
owing to significant differences based on geopoliti-
cal, ethical, equity, and climate issues’ (Ref 7, p. 52).
Under conditions of an extreme planetary emergen-
cy—if such a state could be adequately defined—the
requirements for just procedure might end up being
loosened. Hyping such an emergency is obviously in
the interests of those who want to develop and test
geoengineering now.25 For this reason, one should pay
close attention to the way geoengineering is framed in
the emerging cultural discourse (see Box 2).22
Distributive Justice
Though predicted to be uncertain and uneven,72,73
efforts must be made to distribute the benefits and
burdens of CDR and SRM fairly. In the case of SRM,
Keith et al. have stressed ‘it is vital to remember that
a world cooled by managing sunlight will not be the
same as one cooled by lowering emissions’ (Ref 74,
p. 426). There will be no return to the exact conditions
of some Edenic, pre-industrial climate. To the degree
that the characteristics of an engineered climate can
be predicted, choices will have to be made about who
gets what in a geoengineered world. Clearly there
are concerns that the interests of the most powerful
would be protected, while those less powerful will
BOX 2
THE RHETORIC AND FRAMING
OF CLIMATE ENGINEERING
As a relatively new technology emerging in an
age of instant and obsessive media scrutiny, the
question of how geoengineering gets publicly
framed creates significant ethical issues of its
own.
Already, a number of different framings
suggest different ethical approaches. The idea
of geoengineering as a ‘plan B’ or ‘insurance’
presents the technology as embodying a mature
and cautious wisdom, even though it creates
some worry about how insurance can encourage
risky behavior.1,2,7,16–22 SRM, however, is a type
of insurance attended by significant costs of its
own in terms of the burdens it may impose. Scott
suggests that ‘planetary emergency device’ (Ref
36, p. 157) might better capture this risky reality.
An alternative ‘lesser of two evils’ framing
might increase the sense of an urgent and
unavoidable need to address anthropogenic
warming, even though some worry this framing
increases the likelihood of moral corruption and
procrastination on emissions reduction.25
Geoengineering researchers have tried to
reframe the technology. ‘Sunlight Reflection
Methods’ sounds less hubristic than ‘Solar Radi-
ation Management’, even though they fortu-
itously share the same acronym. A recent report
attempted to rebrand climate engineering as
‘Climate Remediation’, a move that created some
dissent among the report’s authors.71 Caldeira
has suggested that the term ‘geoengineering’
is both vague and emotionally-charged, recom-
mending that individual technologies be con-
sidered on their merits rather than lumped
together under a single, unhelpful umbrella
term.i
With a technology so powerful, it is
unsurprising that the way geoengineering is
characterized has consequences.
get secondary consideration (if they are considered at
all). If, contra the Oxford Principles, geoengineering
were to be controlled privately, then market-based
incentives might steer the benefits away from those
who most need them toward those most able to pay.
Since those most vulnerable to adverse impacts are
also those least likely to have caused climate change,
are least capable of adapting to it, and have the least
input into geoengineering technologies, vulnerability
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to burdens is skewed heavily in certain directions. This
demands extreme vigilance, and more conscience than
has yet been shown, if distributional justice is to be
protected.55
When burdens are borne by the vulnerable, some
sort of compensation mechanism will be required, a
point recognized from the earliest ruminations on
climate engineering to the present.75,76 Since the
precise regional effects of climate engineering will
not be predictable, contingency planning will need to
be in place for negative impacts descending rapidly
upon a population. These impacts might include the
need to be swiftly relocated, the need to replace
housing destroyed by extreme weather events, and
the need for emergency potable water. While the
demand for such compensation mechanisms seems
daunting, objecting to geoengineering on the grounds
of uneven burdens is an overreaction. Anthropogenic
climate change is already causing uneven burdens
that need to be compensated, something recognized
by the call for ‘differential responsibilities’ in the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in 1992. This need is certain to continue with
geoengineering.
Determining when a future burden is the conse-
quence of a ‘natural’ weather event, of anthropogenic
climate change, or of geoengineering will be next to
impossible.7,77 Benefits and burdens are also likely
to fall more upon future generations-whose number
and identity are not yet known-than on the present
generation, making the demands of distributive justice
extremely challenging to satisfy.78,79 With the various
needs crossing geographical, generational, and species
lines, it is hard to see how the challenges of distribu-
tional justice are going to be any more readily solvable
than those of procedural justice.
‘Incidentals’
In addition to the two major justice issues, a
wide range of supplemental concerns have been
raised in relation to the actual implementation of
geoengineering. Atmospheric scientist Alan Robock
articulated 20 reasons why geoengineering may be a
bad idea.80 Several reasons raise concerns that might
be described as ‘incidental’ to changing temperatures
and atmospheric carbon concentrations.j With SRM,
ocean acidification will continue, leading to coral
reef damage and degradation of marine habitat. In
the case of stratospheric aerosols, the ozone layer is
likely to be damaged, leading to uncertain impacts on
phytoplankton, plants, eyes, and skin. The diffuse light
caused by cloud and aerosol modifications will have
impacts on crop productivity and on the effectiveness
of photovoltaic panels. Stratospheric aerosols will
cause less aesthetically appealing whiter skies and
create challenges for astronomy. While many of these
incidental impacts are undesirable, not all of them are
obviously bad. More diffuse light can increase crop
productivity81 and the filtering effect of aerosols on
ultra violet light is likely to decrease the incidence of
skin cancers. Sunsets could also be more beautiful.80
Good or bad, the fact that these incidental impacts
have a bearing on human and environmental well-
being brings additional ethical considerations into
play.
While sidestepping a number of the atmospheric
impacts of SRM detailed by Robock, some forms of
CDR have generated their own ecological concerns.
Attempts at ocean fertilization have been stopped
on environmental grounds and the Convention on
Biological Diversity recently imposed a nominal
moratorium on geoengineering ‘until there is an
adequate scientific basis on which to justify such
activities and appropriate consideration of the
associated risks’.k The type of CDR technology
under discussion clearly makes a difference to the
ecological impacts. Direct air capture may raise
different questions from liming the oceans due to
the way the materials employed will disperse through
an ecosystem.l
Another caution about the incidental impacts of
CDR concerns the scale on which these technologies
have to operate to have a significant impact on
atmospheric carbon. Axon and Lubansky have made
rough estimates of the engineering infrastructure
required for removing the 30 gigatons (Gt) of
carbon dioxide emitted globally each year. Direct
air capture could require up to 120 Gt of clean
water each year, possibly depriving up to 53 million
people of their water supply.82 For enhanced
weathering of rocks, 100 Gt of olivine would
be required which is approximately 12,500 times
current global production.m Latham et al.83 have
estimated that tropospheric cloud seeding would
require approximately 1500 spray producing vessels
operating continuously across the oceans, a more
manageable infrastructure perhaps, but still a costly
one. While the calculations are rough, they illustrate
how some CDR technologies create their own
environmental effects simply through the scale of the
engineering required.
TEMPORAL SPACE 4:
POST-IMPLEMENTATION
At this point it should be clear that there are a
wide range of ethical issues to be solved before
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implementation of geoengineering. Any number of
these might prove decisive. It is far from obvious
that all these moral requirements could today be
satisfied. But let us assume they could be met, or
that a climate catastrophe of such magnitude loomed
that the requirements were loosened. Are there other
ethical worries to consider?
Termination Problem
If SRM is initiated then it is likely that, in the
absence of any dramatic success in reducing emissions,
greenhouse gases will continue to accumulate in the
atmosphere even as planetary temperatures cool. As
already mentioned, this feature of SRM allows the
continuation of ocean acidification. Another problem
awaits. Should any event—either geopolitical or
climatic—make it necessary to rapidly cease SRM
then temperatures would rise very quickly indeed
under these elevated carbon dioxide scenarios.84,85
In addition to the obvious danger for humanity,
the threat posed to species would be significant.
While some highly mobile species might be able
to survive climate change by migrating north (or
upwards) or simply by adopting different behaviors,
the chances of doing so decrease dramatically as
the rate of temperature change increases.86 One
might hope that this ‘termination problem’ could
be avoided through careful research of potential
SRM side effects and through stable political
institutions being established prior to implementation.
However, the complexity of the climate system,
the challenge raised by the limited ability to field
test, and the perfect moral storm of climate change
mean that a number of scientific and political
uncertainties about long-term deployment are likely
to remain.
Cessation Mechanisms
Geoengineering is often framed as a question of
‘buying time’7,87,88 until adequate mitigation and/or
adaptation measures can be put in place. It may not
be easy, however, to determine when enough time
has been bought. With CDR, it would theoretically
be possible to set a long-term parts per million
(ppm) target for atmospheric carbon as a trigger
point for cessation. This target would not only
take a long-time to achieve, but climate inertia
caused by the large heat capacity of the oceans
may mean that even a ‘satisfactory’ ppm number
would not necessarily indicate that temperatures were
about to return to ‘normal’.89 Warmer temperatures
and the dangers associated with them would be
in store for many decades as the oceans slowly
cooled. In the interim, some coupling of CDR and
SRM may be necessary to temporarily reduce these
temperatures.
Furthermore, cessation of CDR would depend
entirely on progress on emissions reduction. If
a promising CDR strategy had the effect of
persuading people to let emissions levels remain
high, any ppm trigger point for cessation may
rapidly be exceeded again as soon as CDR is
removed. In all likelihood, with economic costs
comparable to mitigation, both CDR and mitigation
would be occurring simultaneously. The distinction
between removing carbon from the atmosphere
and not emitting it in the first place—CDR
versus further emissions reduction—may then become
increasingly blurry. At that point, CDR could become
the favored mitigation strategy and the idea of
perpetual CDR could become attractive, forever
changing the political calculus and creating a ‘new
normal’.
In the case of SRM, the same questions about
incentives for mitigation and adaptation arise, but
with an additional complicating factor. Even if
emissions have been dramatically reduced, the already
accumulated carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would
only have been masked by SRM and not reduced.
Whenever SRM was removed, planetary warming
would continue. The timescale over which that carbon
dioxide would be naturally re-absorbed into the
world’s oceans90—and the current slowing of that
rate91—suggests that SRM would have to continue
long into the future unless some cocktail approach
of ‘SRM plus CDR’ was employed. Technologies
to combat ocean acidification would also be needed
to counter continued elevated atmospheric carbon
dioxide.
Cessation of geoengineering technologies is
clearly not as simple as hitting a temperature or
ppm target and saying ‘stop’. Decisions about the
pathway toward emissions reduction and removal of
any geoengineering technology would be contentious.
The global community would face a complicated
politics akin to the current challenges presented by
climate change. While this politics may not prove
impossible, the future of both SRM and CDR would
always be woven both into each other and into
ongoing mitigation and adaptation.
Designer Climates
The fact that difficult choices would need to be
made over when and how to cease geoengineering
bleeds over into a different problem concerning
design. Questions raised earlier about distributional
justice hint at the fact that some countries may
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be better off under some climate change or
geoengineering scenarios than they were before.
Canadians, for example, may perceive themselves to
reap economic benefits from an ice-free Northwest
Passage. Parts of Russia may be on track to become
more suitable for growing crops under warming
temperatures and increased carbon dioxide levels.
Parts of Africa may look forward to the benefits
of increased precipitation if it could be reliably
manufactured.
Attempts at modifying the weather have
a long and undistinguished history.92 Should
geoengineering make it possible to design climates
by carefully tweaking certain carbon dioxide or
solar radiation parameters, it might be tempting to
do so. The taboo mentioned earlier about open
discussion of geoengineering also applies to its
implementation. Once the taboo against intentional
climate modification had been broken, it seems
probable that there would be a slippery slope toward
‘designer climates’ where the whole idea of restoring
a ‘natural’ climate had been abandoned entirely.
Ellis enthusiastically embraces this hope, stating
‘[c]reating the future will mean going beyond fears
of transgressing natural limits and nostalgic hopes of
returning to some pastoral or pristine era . . . [w]e
must not see the Anthropocene as a crisis, but as
the beginning of a new geological epoch ripe with
human-directed opportunity’ (Ref 93).
Szerszynski and Galarraga94 have discussed
various lenses through which one might consider
this work of ‘making climate’. Since the climate
is a constantly changing ‘metastable’ system, they
suggest geoengineers would not be able to simply
adjust one variable and then sit back and watch things
unfold (Ref 94, p. 223). More likely is that a series
of continual adjustments would be required in order
to keep the climate heading where its manipulators
wanted it to go. This places those in control, they
suggest, more into the role of ‘artists’ than anything
else, forced into a continuous realm of decision
making and creative engineering endeavor. To some
extent, today’s efforts at pollution control on marine
diesel engines and coal-fired powerplants are already
‘making climate’. Geoengineering would make the
design questions explicit.
CONCLUSION
The range of ethical issues discussed does not exhaust
those that would have to be considered before an
ethically acceptable geoengineering project could be
implemented. It merely hints at the complexity. The
schema utilized should also not mask the continuous
ebb and flow of these issues across the various
temporal spaces described. As indicated, the type
of technology deployed, the seriousness of the crisis
being faced, and the plans in place for adaptation,
mitigation, and cessation would all influence the
different ethical considerations.
In 1996 in the first article by a professional
ethicist on geoengineering, Dale Jamieson concluded
that the conditions for moral permissibility of
intentional climate change ‘are not now satisfied’
(Ref 31, p. 323). Sixteen years later, with climate
impacts more apparent and the ethical concerns
more widely recognized and numerous, Jamieson’s
statement likely still holds true. It should be clear,
however, that it can now be delivered with increasingly
less calm.
NOTES
aThe social and governance issues the report refers to
are difficult precisely because the ethical desiderata
one would be required to meet for democratic
governance of geoengineering are so tough.
bThe NERC report12 showed that this was not always
the case.
cSome ultimately praiseworthy actions, such as
running for national office can often include a bit
of hubris.
dCertainly other arguments are possible. Opponents
talk about the finite nature of fossil fuel resources, the
concentration of power that follows their extraction,
and their tendency to foster geopolitical instability.
eSee the Web sites of Hands off Mother Earth
(www.handsoffmotherearth.org) and the ETC Group
(www.etcgroup.org) for examples.
f The S.P.I.C.E. project did voluntarily adopt those
principles to govern their own ill-fated field
experiment.
gAn example of this obtuseness is the widely perceived
failure of the ‘make or break’ Copenhagen conference
in December 2009.
hThe extent of the variability in effectiveness of SRM
is under debate with some believing the unevenness
may not be as great as suggested.95
iSee a discussion on the Geoengineering googlegroup
in 2011 under the threads ‘HOME article’ and ‘We
don’t need a ‘‘geoengineering’’ research program.’
jThe use of the term ‘incidental’ here is tongue-
in-cheek. In no way is it intended to diminish
the significance of the additional concerns. It is
intended to point out that there are numerous
unintended side-effects of geoengineering schemes that
might in themselves provide sufficient reason not to
proceed.
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kUN Convention on Biological Diversity COP 10
Decision X/33, section 8 (w) http://www.cbd.int/
decision/cop/?id=12299 (Accessed July 8, 2012).
lThe U.S. Congressional Research Service has differ-
entiated between ‘encapsulated’ and ‘unencapsulated’
geoengineering technologies, suggesting that the latter
are generally perceived as presenting more environ-
mental risk.96
mA more detailed discussion of material require-
ments for enhance weathering can be found in
Ref 97.
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